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Abstract
Worldwide, natural gas markets have changed drastically after the overall deregulation
started in the eighties. In this paper, we introduce an analytical framework to address the
supply and pricing policy of a gas supplier that has to reserve transportation capacity in or-
der to deliver natural gas to nal users. The main characteristic of our approach lies in the
treatment of the demand uncertainty that the supplier faces. Indeed, when it has to book its
transportation capacity, the supplier does not know the demand with certainty. This paper
denes the optimal policy for the natural gas supplier rstly by the price proposed to nal users
that are willing to commit themselves in an advanced purchase of gas ; secondly by the price
proposed to nal users who did not commit themselves in advance and who buy their gas on a
spot basis ; thirdly by the optimal capacity reservation made by the gas supplier to the trans-
portation network. Our model is based on two complementary assumptions : we assume that
the gas supplier has a market power and that the regulator xes the network access capacity
price on a cost plus basis.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, the main characteristics of natural gas markets have changed drastically after the overall
deregulation started in the eighties. This evolution begun in the United State where Orders 436
and 636 compelled vertically integrated gas companies use their transport facilities. Third Party
Access (TPA) to natural gas pipelines is considered as one of the necessary conditions to open
natural gas markets to competition. In Europe, the UK has been the rst country to go into the
gas market opening.
Today, regulated third party access to national pipelines is implemented all over Europe. Every
network company, wether it is linked to a supplier or not, has to oer transportation taris on a
non-discriminatory basis.
Besides, natural gas industry is characterized by uncertainty that, on the demand side comes
from weather conditions or economic variables (growth for instance). This uncertainty has a hudge
impact on the strategies that can be implemented as far as gas transportation on dierent networks
is concerned. On the other side, natural gas transporters have to take this uncertainty into account
while setting their taris. Generally, they propose two kinds of service: rm or interruptible.
Interruptible capacity is oerred with a discount rate compared to the rm one. For most of the
european pipelines, rm capacity can be booked on an annual basis but also on a monthly or a
daily basis. Considering the uncertainty that exists on natural gas consumptions, network operators
naturally tend to favor long commitment. Thus, the price for monthly capacity is generally set at
a higher level than the twelfth of the annual price and for daily capacity, price is superior to the
thirtieth of the monthly.
Thus, the reservation strategy that a shipper has to dene in order to sell gas to end users is
sophisticated because of this demand uncertainty. Precisely, we assume that when it must reach
a decision concerning annual rm capacity, it does not know the exact demand that will occur
in subsequent periods. To stick with reality, we assume that there is no complete set of markets
a la Arrow-Debreu where all the risks could be insured through appropriate insurance contracts
or contingent pricing1. We assume instead that the rm delivering natural gas for some given
period can use two type of simple linear pricing contracts. For any given period of consumption
(say a given calendar month), either the client commits in advance to purchase a given quantity
of gas (advance purchase) or the client decides upon this quantity at the beginning of the period.
The rm oers a menu of two linear prices : one for advance purchases and another one for spot
1The analysis of prices and market behavior in environments with a set of incomplete markets raises subtle and
sometimes unexpected conclusions (see e.g. Green and Polemarchakis (1976), Green and Sheshinski (1975)). At this
stage, we dont oer any insight on the rationale for any particular market architecture. We take the current market
environment and the constraints that it imposes on transactions as given.
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purchases. The rm faces dierent risks. First, when xing the two prices, it cannot predict for
sure what will be the volumes demanded for each type of transaction and second, when booking
capacity on transportation networks, it cannot assert for sure if the rm annual capacity will be
fully utilized. The client who purchases some of its gas in advance also faces a risk as the value
(need, utility,..) of gas consumption is not surely known at term. Likely, the second risk faced by
the rm price will depend also upon the existence and eciency of a secondary market for natural
gas transportation2. In Europe, most of the network operators have settled mechanisms (such as
electronic bulletin board) that allow shippers to exchange capacities. Nontheless there have not
been so many transactions on these secondary markets. In addition most of the network operators3
apply the "use-it-or-lose-it" rule in order to prevent forclusion strategy. Indeed, a supplier could
be tempted to book capacity far beyond its real needs in order to prevent access to network to
other potential suppliers. Currently, the most used allocation rule in Europe is the "rst come, rst
served", the UK and Hungary are exceptions as they use auctions mechanisms to pipeline capacity
allocation . This fact can be interpreted as an indicator of sucient capacity in Europe. That is
why, in this paper, we ignore the risk of rationing for capacity reservation.
The structure of the market(s) involving the demand and supply of natural gas is moving rapidly.
It is fair to say that the current situation is conveniently described as a market which is imperfectly
competitive as only few actors4 with non negligible market power operate on these markets (and
sometimes other energy markets) despite the eorts of the regulator(s). In this paper we will point
our attention towards the capacity reservations and pricing decisions of a rm enjoying a monopoly
position in the sense that the clients of this rm are captive. This must be viewed as a preliminary
step to an assessment of the consequences of the regulatory policies on the functioning of the market
and the welfare of the clients. This is part of a sequential game where the regulator moves rst and
can commit on its decisions. Its move is then followed by moves from the various private actors. The
nal prediction will depend upon the details of the modelling of the oligopolistic market. Solving
backward the game describing the competition, provides the regulator with an exact evaluation of
the consequences of the alternative policies that it may consider. Then, we see this manuscript as
part of a larger project to understand the main features of the optimal policy of a regulator aiming
2They will certainly play an important role when they will be fully implemented. McAfee, Doane, Nayyar and
Williams (2006) analyse the implication of pipeline residual rights on the competitiveness of the secundary market for
natural gas transportation. They oer a critique of some aspects of the current practices of the US Federal Energy
regulatory Commission. Raineri and Kuik (2003) examine the issue from a dynamic perspective and and apply their
methodology to Chile.
3Among those network operators, one can nd French, Netherland, Italian, Austrian en Denish ones.
4On April 1, 2006, only 9% of the population of eligible clients i.e. 63900 clients buy their gas to the market price
(there is the possibility to buy gas to a public price totally under the control of the government). Among those, only
18400 lients switch from their historic suppliers to a new entrant. The number of suppliers active on the market has
however increased from 10 on January 1, 2005 to 14 on January 1, 2006 (CRE (2006)).
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to control a market displaying imperfect competition.
We don't explain in this paper the motivation behind the choices of the regulator. Under
the assumption that it is not captured but aiming to maximize some social objective, the access
prices imposed to the pipeline networks operators are intended to reect their costs (capacity and
operating). Investment planning in pipeline capacities is a delicate matter as there is no market and
these prices can also be used to send signals to rms using the network and determine subsequently
possible over or underinvestment5.
A key ingredient of our approach is the stochastic dimension of the demand for natural gas by
either commercial, industrial or residential. We oer a model of the demand of natural gas for some
period depending upon the two prices proposed by the provider but also on some other elements
which are not modelled explicitely and are uncertain when the client must decide upon its advance
purchases. Besides weather conditions, we may think of many other elements like for instance
levels of activity or prices of alternative energy inputs in the case or industrial clients. This volatil-
ity should be kept distinct from the seasonal "predictable" variations which is well documented
problem. Any client is therefore described by a list of parameters including price elasticities and
volatilities. In practice, volatility is not easy to quantied unless the client consumption is mea-
sured almost in continuous time as done for large clients. On the price elasticities side, we would
have in principle two direct elasticities and one cross elasticity. To the best of our knowledge, no
empirical analysis of this sophisticated consumer or input choice is available. Past and existing
studies concentrate on a single demand for natural gas. While quasi-null in the short run, direct
natural gas price elasticities are far from being negligible. In their celebrated paper, Balestra and
Nerlove (1966) found for the United States over the period 1950-1962 an elasticity ranging from
0.58 to 0.69. This is conrmed for instance by Beierlein, Dunn and McConnon (1981) for the
northeastern United States over the period 1967-1977 who found for industrial clients an elasticity
equal to 2.86 with respect to the value added6.
5GDF Reseau-Transport examines the opportunity of an increase of its entry capacities in the northeastern part
of France :Le besoin potentiel d'une augmentation des capacites d'acheminement au point d'entree Obergailach est
apparu a l'occasion de dierentes demandes non engageantes emanant d'expediteurs de gaz et de gestionnaires du
reseau de transport amont, et de la propre analyse de gaz de france Reseau Transport sur l'evolution des ux de gaz
en Europe. Gaz de france Reseau Transport souhaite disposer debons indicateurs pour realiser les investissements
correspondants aux souhaits de ses clients, a des conditions economiques raisonnables, tant pour les beneciaires des
capacites nouvelles que pour l'ensemble des clients de Gaz de france reseau Transport. A ce titre, des engagements
portant sur des capacites et une duree susante sont indispensables pour mener a bien le projet". L'operateur de
transport explique que cet investissement est motive par des demandes recues par des expediteurs. L'investissement
consiste soit en un doublement de la canalisation jusqu'a Chateau-Salins sur une distance de 37 km avec rajout
d'un compresseur a la station de Laneveulotte soit jusqu' a Laneveulotte sur une distance de 54 km avec rajout
de deux compresseurs permettant d'augmenter les capacites d'acheminement de 120 a 220 GWh/j suppementaires.
An de prevoir les meilleurs choix techniques, l'operateur demande aux expediteurs interesses de bien vouloir se faire
connaitre et exprimer leurs besoins de capacites. La duree minimale de demande de reservation non engageante est
xee a 10 ans".
6Thse estimations are based on cross section and time series macro-data. there are also a number of studies based
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The paper consists then of two parts. In the rst part, we develop a model to derive the
demand behavior of residential and industrial clients for natural gas. This model ignores income
eects and aims to point out some of the key forces behind the decision of a client to buy a large
or small quantity of gas and to possibly dier its purchases until uncertainty is resolved. The
second part integrates the demand behavior into a multiproduct monopoly problem. We oer a
complete solution to the three dimensional problem of such monopoly : how many pipeline capacity
to reserve in advance, how to price respectively advance and spot purchases ? This raises a number
of questions on top of which : how the two reservation prices imposed by the regulator to the
network operator are going to be translated into the prices of the monopoly ? Likely, given its
market power, price elasticities and volatilities will play a role and prices will unlikely reect truly
the marginal costs supported by the rm. It is then important to evaluate the gap between the
ratio of prices and the ratio of costs. In the process of our analysis, we also derive the optimal
reservation rule. Most of the analysis is conducted in the case where the population of clients is
composed of two homogeneous groups. Even in that case, the analytical derivation becomes rapidly
tricky and we oer a full analysis of the homogeneous case.
Related Literature
While new, the ideas and topics discussed in this paper intersect dierent branches of the
literature on public utility pricing, regulation and industrial organization.
Most of the literature on pricing and regulation with stochastic demand considers as a primitive
the aggregate demand. In a pionnering work, Boiteux (1951) has raised the question of optimal
pricing of individual stochastic demand under the assumption that the capacity network must meet
an exogeneous reliability constraint. In the case where each individual demand was Gaussian, he
was able to derive the pair of optimal prices : each client pays according to the mean and the
standard deviation of its consumption. His analysis has been continued by Dreze (1964) and Kolm
(1970) who point out the necessity of using personalized prices and the role of correlation accross
demands. It is very interesting to note that while theoretical, the Hopkinson rate which is a very
common method of pricing electricity and gas for industrial use is strongly related to the idea of
pricing the standard deviation of consumption as demonstrated by Veall (1983). The Hopkinson
rate consists of a demand charge based on the maximum usage during any quarter-hour period
during a month. This pricing dimension should be kept distinct from the temporal peak dimension
of consumption and the resulting TOU (time-of-use) pricing methods (Seeto, Woo, et Horowitz
(1997) and Woo, Horii et Horowitz (2002)). Our model does not take as primitives the individual
demands but derives these demands from maximization in a market environment where transactions
on micro-data like for instance Baker, Blundell and Micklewright (1989) and Leth-Petersen.
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are however constrained. In contrast to Boiteux who assume inelastic demands, we examine the
response of the demands to price changes and point out the role of the derived price elasticities. In
our paper, we consider advance purchase pricing and spot pricing but our model could be extended
to include more sophisticated pricing options.
Our paper is also very related to the literature on equilibria in markets where both individ-
ual and aggregate demand is uncertain and rms set prices before demand is known (Carlton
(1978)(1979)(1991), Dana (1998)(1999), Eden (1990)). In the competitive case, small rms sell
in a spot market but must set their spot market prices and quantities before demand is known.
As rst shown by Prescott (1975) with such a context of uncertain aggregate demand, goods may
be oered and sold at dierent prices in equilibrium. Firms must decide how much to supply at
each price. Since spot prices do not adjust to clear the market, rationing occurs in equilibrium
and capacity may not be fully utilized. Dana (1998) generalizes the basic Prescott model to allow
rms to make advance-purchase sales. Like in our paper, these contracts are restricted to standard
sales contracts, contingent contracts or contracts that specify probabilistic delivery of the good
(e.g. priority service pricing) 7. Gales and Holmes ((1992),(1993)) examines the rationale of an
advance-purchase discount policy from the perspective of a monopoly facing demand uncertainty.
Finally, our paper is also a contribution to the analysis of multiproduct monopolies. In our
model, there is a single physical product but the timing of purchase leads to two dierent products
from the perspective of the clients. The optimal pricing policy of a multiproduct monopoly has
been examined in many papers with focus on questions like bundling or cross subsidization8. Our
paper adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing. By
setting with those features, it has been demonstrated that posting several prices may be optimal
(Dana (2001), Wilson (1988)9). There are very few models of imperfect competition in market
environments like those considered here. A notable exception is Deneckere and Peck (1995) who
consider a game where rms set prices and capacities and then a random number of consumers
attend the market and select a rm to visit10.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our model of residential
and industrial stochastic demand for natural gas. Then in section 3, we derive and interpret the
optimal policy of the monopoly in terms of pipeline capacity reservations and advance-purchase
and spot pricing. We conclude with a description of a number of directions of extension of the
7See, for instance, Spulber (1992a,b) and Wilson (1989) for the examination of alternative policies.
8See Tirole (1988) for an overview.
9In Wilson (1988) there is no aggregate uncertainty but it is assumed that a large number of consumers visit the
rm in random order.
10There is also a related literature on the implications of future markets on the equilibria of oligopolistic spot
markets (see e.g. Allaz (1992), Allaz and Vila (1993), Mahenc and salanie (2004) and Murphy and Smeers (2005)).
Note however that advance-pruchase discounts is something dierent from forward trading.
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current work.
2 The Demand for Natural Gas
We consider a monopolist distributing gas to a "captive" population of heterogeneous consumers.
We are interested in explaining the volumes of trade and the prices paid by these customers at time
t or more precisely during the period [t; t+]. The rm holding this monopoly position has two
important technological decisions : it can reserve some transportation capacity one period ahead
i.e. at time t    for the unitary price of c. It has however the possibility to proceed to some
extra reservation of transportation capacity at time t for the unitary price c. We assume here that
there is no secondary market for unused capacity which implies that the monopoly may well be in
a situation where it has to incur the full cost of a transportation capacity which is under utilized at
time t. We also ignore here the event that the monopoly could be unable to reserve the "missing"
capacity at time t11. The monopoly must precommit to two prices : a unitary price p for any
volume of gas that a client may ordered at time t    for a delivery/consumption at time t and
a unitary price p for any volume of gas ordered at time t for an immediate delivery/consumption.
The contractual universe consists simply of these two linear prices.
The specic feature of our model is the stochastic character of the demand from the perspec-
tive of the rm. The rm "investment" (here reservations) decisions cannot be delayed until the
resolution of uncertainty. The analysis is conducted within a reference time period and we will not
pay any attention to the temporal dimension of gas consumption12. If it was possible to design a
complete set of contingent markets a la Arrow-Debreu, we would have a price for each possible con-
tingency and each consumer would have to select a contingent consumption plan. In such market
environment, uncertainty would disappear for the local gas supplier without implying, of course,
that there is no excess capacity in some contingency. We also know that such organization of the
transactions leads to an ecient allocation of resources and in particular optimal risk sharing. We
assume that this market organization is not possible or, more precisely, we assume that it is not
possible to oer all the contingent delivery contracts associated to these markets. In this second
best setting, the gas supplier cannot accomodate all contingencies without investing in capacity up
to the point that even the worst case could be handled without risk of default. In this section,
we rst model the demand behavior of household and rms when a single price is posted for the
period which is considered. Then, we describe the costs of the rm. Finally, we describe the market
11This sounds at rst glance inconsistent with our assumption that the reservation price is regulated and therefore
not exible to accomodate an excess demand of transportation capacity at time t.
12The explicit introduction of time does not raise any specic conceptual diculty. However, this aspect, on top
of which peak load pricing, has been widely discussed in the literature and is not the main focus of our manuscript
which deals with other sources of the variability in demand.
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environment i.e. the type of transactions that are possible.
2.1 The Demand for Natural Gas at Time t from residential Clients
The main purpose of this section is to oer a simple model13 explaining how a client of the monopoly
reacts to the pair of prices (p; p) i.e. plans its gas consumption for the period. This simple model
aims not only to explain what will be the volume of gas consumed by this client in reaction to the
menu of prices but also how it will share this total consumption between an advance-purchase and
the spot market. This will depends of course upon its need/preference/value for gas consumption
in contrast to other commodities. The key assumption is that the valuation of this client depends
upon informations which are not all disclosed at time t . Precisely, we assume that the preference
of a generic household for gas consumption at time t    is described by the quasi-linear utility
function
V (x; !) +M (1)
where x denotes its consumption for the period [t; t+], ! is a real number and M denotes
the other consumption expenditures. We denote by R the consumption budget of this household.
As explained above, at time t   , this household is oered the possibility of ordering some gas
at a unitary price p. Then at time t, he can always proceeds to some ultimate arrangements (if
needed) once the all relevant information will have been conciled. It is assumed here that the real
parameter ! is random and that its realization will take place at time t. This implies that any
household planning to order some gas at time t  faces some uncertainty. The expression in (1)
describes in monetary units the value of the consumption plan (x;M) when the realization of the
random variable e! is !. To evaluate ex ante, i.e. at time t   , the value of this plan, we need
to introduce the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility U of this household which reects its attitude
towards risk. The value of the consumption plan (x;M) is then :
U (V (x; !) +M)
In the contractual environment considered here, a consumption plan for the period [t; t+] is
a vector (x, x(!);M) where x represents its advance purchase at time t   and x(!) represents
its spot purchase at time t when uncertainty has been resolved : x(!) denotes its purchase when
the realization of the random variable is !. When the range of the random variable e! consists of
13This model is of course simplistic in many respects as it wants to focus on a specic feature, namely the volatility
in gas consumption and its consequences on pricing. A complete model of gas consumption should recognize the time
dimension of the problem and the impossibility to separate the investment decision in some durable equipments for
energy consumption and the subsequent decisions on input consumptions. This
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a nite set 
 and (!) is the probability of the event fe! = !g, the expected utility derived from
the purchase plan (x, x(!);M) is :
X
!2

(!)U(V (x+ x(!); !)  px  px(!) +R) (2)
The rst order conditions are :
X
!2

(!)U 0(V (x+ x(!); !)  px  px(!) +R)

@V
@x
(x+ x(!); !)  p

= 0 si x > 0 (3)
and
@V
@x
(x+ x(!); !)  p = 0 si x(!) > 0 (4)
Without any further assumption on the primitives, equations (3) and (4) are not easy to solve
in full generality. For instance, when U is of the CARA type i.e. U(z) =  e z where  is a
positive parameter, equation (3) simplies to :
X
!2

(!)e (V (x+x(!);!) px(!))

@V
@x
(x+ x(!); !)  p

= 0
Note however that U does not play any role in equations (4) which is fairly natural as they
describe optimal supplementary purchase of gas once uncertainty has totally disappeared.
To handle these equations, we introduce a number of simplications. First, we suppose that
each household is risk neutral. In this case, equation (3) simplies to :
X
!2

(!)

@V
@x
(x+ x(!); !)  p

= 0 if x > 0 (5)
When we will consider a population of households, each of them will be identied by an index
i = 1; :::::; I1. The parameters and variables will be subsequently indexed with i : Vi; Ui;
i; i and
Ri. Heterogeneity across households dervies from multidimensional spanning income, preferences
for gas and risk attitudes. Under risk neutrality and quasi linearity, income and risk eects are
eliminated. We are left with intrinsic preference heterogeneity with two channels : the impact of x
for a given ! and the impact of ! for a given x.
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2.2 The Binomial Specication
We now specify further the framework by describing the inuence of uncertainty on the value of
gas consumption. The key feature is the binomial character14 of the stochastic inuence of the
state of the world !: for each client i either the state of the world is favorable to gas consumption
xi or it is not. Moreover, the states of the world favorable to gas consumption may dier sharply
accross clients. A state of the world is a vector describing the subpopulation of clients receiving a
favorable signal. Precisely :

 =
I1Y
i=1
f!i; !ig
where for all i = 1; 2; :::; I1 , !i et !i are two real numbers such that : !i < !i. Without
loss of generality, we suppose hereafter that !i = 0; !i refers to circumstances unfavorable to gas
consumption from the perspective of client i. We denote i the probability of the event f!i(t) = 0g.
Finally, we assume that for all i = 1; :::; I1 :
Vi(xi; !) = vi(xi + !i)
where vi is an increasing and strictly concave continuously dierentiable function. In this
simplied setting, a consumption purchase plan is a three dimensional vector (xi, xi(!i); xi (!i)) =
(xi, xi(0); xi (!i)). The expected utility of client i for such plan becomes :
ivi(xi + xi(!i)) + (1  i)vi(xi + xi(!i) + !i)  pxi   p(ixi(0) + (1  i)xi(!i))
Equations (4) simplies to :
(
v0i(xi + xi(0)) = p i v0i(xi)  p
v0i(xi + xi(!i) + !i) = p i v0i(xi + !i)  p
(6)
If v0i(xi) < p (respectively v0i(xi+!i) < p), then xi(0) = 0 (respectively xi(!i) = 0). Since vi has
been assumed to be strictly concave, we deduce that if v0i(xi) < p then v0i(xi   !i) < p. Therefore,
from (6), if xi(!i) > 0, then xi(0) > 0. On the other hand, equation (5) simplies to :
iv
0
i(xi + xi(0)) + (1  i) v0i(xi + xi(!i) + !i) = p si xi > 0 (7)
We deduce from equations (6) et (7) that necessarily :
14We could opt for a continuous state space. Our modelling choice is just driven by convenience.
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xi(!i) = 0
Indeed, if on the contrary xi(!i) > 0; since xi(0) > 0, we deduce from (6) :
iv
0
i(xi + xi(0)) + (1  i) v0i(xi + xi(!i) + !i) = p
which contradicts (7) since p > p. The intuition driving this result is fairly simple. Here, a
circumstance which is adverse to gas consumption leads to a decrease of the marginal utility of gas
with respect to a reference consumption. In our binary setting, this happens when !i = !i and in
such case, it is optimal to purchase the contingent optimal quantity of gas at the lowest possible
price i.e. in advance. If in contrast, circumstances turn to be favorable, then the spot market
will be (likely) used to proceed to some additional purchases. An immediate implication of this
observation is that a purchase plan of client i reduces to a two dimensional vector (xi; xi(0)); that
we will denote simply (xi; xi). The rst order conditions become :
iv
0
i(xi + xi) + (1  i) v0i(xi + !i) = p if xi > 0 (8)
and
v0i(xi + xi) = p si xi > 0
Client i nds optimal to purchase its gas in advance if the unique solution xi of the following
equation :
iv
0
i(xi) + (1  i) v0i(xi + !i) = p (9)
satises
v0i(xi)  p (10)
Similarly, client i nds optimal to purchase all its gas on the spot market if :
iv
0
i(xi) + (1  i) v0i(!i)  p (11)
where xi is the unique solution of the equation:
11
v0i(xi) = p (12)
This happens if and only if the following inequality holds true :
v0i(!i) 
p  ip
1  i
For instance when p is smaller than ip, we conclude that this cannot happen. The inequality
is less likely to hold true when p is small, p is large and v0i(!i) is large. In contrast, the eect of i
is ambiguous.
Finally, client i will not purchase gas (at all) if :
iv
0
i(0) + (1  i) v0i(!i)  p et v0i(0)  p
Let xi(p) be the unique solution to equation (8). Inequality (9) becomes :
p  p  (1  i) v
0
i(xi(p) + !i)
i
 '

p

From the implicit function theorem, we deduce :
x0i(p) =
1
iv00i (xi) + (1  i) v00i (xi + !i)
and then :
'0

p

=
1  (1 i)v0i"(xi+!i)iv00i (xi)+(1 i)v0i"(xi+!i)
i
=
v00i (xi)
iv00i (xi) + (1  i) v00i (xi + !i)
It should be noted that as soon as v0i(x) tends to 0 when x tends to +1, '

p

tends to 0 when
p tends to 0. Moreover, combining (10) and (11) lead to the inequality :
p  p  (1  i) v
0
i(!i)
i
  (p)
The functions ' et  make the identication of the four potential groups of households in the
population easier : those who do consume gas, those who purchase their gas exclusively in advance,
those who purchase their gas exclusively on the spot market and those who mix with the both. We
note rst that the functions intersect at p = iv
0
i(0) + (1  i) v0i(!i) and '

p

=  

p

= v0i(0).
The curvature of the function ' depends upon the monotonicity of the coecient  v00i (x)v00i (x) . For the
sake of illustration, we consider the case where vi(x) =  e ix where i is a positive parameter.
In such a case :
'

p

=
p
i + (1  i)e ix and  (p) =
p  (1  i)ie ix
i
At time t  , the total gas consumption of household i is a Bernouilli random variable with
mean xi

p; p

+ ixi

p; p

and standard deviation
p
i(1  i)xi

p; p

..
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2.3 The Demand for Natural Gas at Time t from Industrial Clients
Our preceding analysis of the demand has focused exclusively on households. In this subsection, we
sketch a Bernouilli model of demand for natural gas from rms. Here, gas is an energy input used
by rms in their production process and it is implicitely assumed that this input is in competition
with others.
Consider the case of a monoproduct rm described by the cost function C(y; x)+px conditional
upon the purchase of a quantity of gas equal to x at a unitary price of p. Let q denote the unitary
price of the product. When there is no uncertainty on q, the determination of the optimal quantity
of gas to buy is a conventional exercice.
Suppose now that instead, there is a binomial uncertainty on the sale price q : the price q takes
the values q et q with probabilities  and 1 . The desired quantity of gas does not need to be the
same for the two states of the world. Assume that q > q. In such case and under the assumption
that the inputs are normal, then y(q) > y(q). As in the case of households, we distinguish favorable
and unfavorable circumstances for gas consumption. This channel of inuence privileges the impact
of a change in the activity level of the rm following a decline in rentability. Other channels of
inuence could consist for instance in modications of the price of inputs which are complements
or subsitutes to gas.
The analysis of the optimal choices of the rm is very similar to the analysis conducted for
the household. First, there will be no purchase on the spot market when q = q. Indeed, given
the normality assumption, the demand of all the inputs in the favorable case is larger than in
the unfavorable case. The lowest demand of gas is attached to the sale price q and it is better
to purchase gas in advance at the lower price p. This means that the rm will buy at least the
quantity x(p; q). We are left with the question : is it protable to buy in advance a quantity larger
than x(p; q) ? Let x be the quantity of gas purchased in advance by the rm. The expected prot
is then :
Max
y;x
h
qy   C(y; x+ x)  px  px
i
+ (1  )Max
y;x
h
qy   C(y; x+ x)  px  px
i
The important observation is that, at time t, the cost px is sunk. Note also that ouput plan of
the rm and demand factors will depend upon the ex ante decision x. On the spot market, it faces
the unit price p. When circumstances are unfavorable, the constraint x  0 will be active. In such
a case, the manager of the rm optimizes with respect to the short run cost function : everything
is as if, with respect to the prices p et q, his gas input was in excess. Given p, this quantity of gas
would then be optimal for some sale price q > q. We deduce then from the Viner-Wong envelope's
principle that the production y is in between y(p; q) and y(p; q).
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When the circumstances are favorable, the constraint will be likely inactive and the manager
will buy some additional quantity of gas on the spot market. To examine, the validity of these
claims in full generality, we write down the rst oder conditions of the rm. A production plan is
a ve dimensional vector

y(q); y(q); x(q); x (q) ; x

. In the interior case, we obtain :
q   @C
@y
(y(q); x (q) + x) = 0
q   @C
@y
(y(q); x

q

+ x) = 0
 @C
@x
(y(q); x (q) + x) = p
 @C
@x
(y(q); x

q

+ x) = p


 @C
@x
(y(q); x (q) + x)  p

+ (1  )

 @C
@x
(y(q); x

q

+ x)  p

Assume that @
2C
@x@y (y; x) < 0. From the implicit function theorem and the second order condition
@2C
@x2
(y; x) > 0, we deduce that x is an increasing function of y: Further, the supply curve is increasing
in q and therefore y(q) < y(q). We deduce that if x

q

> 0, then x (q) > 0: Indeed, if instead
x (q) = 0, we would obtain
 @C
@x
(y(q); x)  p
But since @
2C
@x@y (y; x) < 0 and y(q) < y(q), we would have :
 @C
@x
(y(q); x)  p
and then, since @
2C
@x2
(y; x) > 0 :
 @C
@x
(y(q); x

q

+ x) < p
But this contradicts the fourth rst order condition. To conclude, we can now observe that it
is impossible to have x

q

> 0 because then we would have x (q) > 0 and after substitution in the
fth equation, we would deduce p = p in contradiction to our assumption.
Like for households, we will consider a population of rms, each of them will be identied by
an index j = 1; :::::; I2 and the parameters and variables will be subsequently indexed with j : Ci
and j . Heterogeneity across rms spans dierences in technology and risk.
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2.4 Aggregate Demand Uncertainty
To conclude the modeling of the demand side, it remains to agregate the individual demand behav-
iors. To do so, we must describe the structure of the uncertainty. We have assumed that each client
i is described by a Bernouilli model totally summarized by a single number i representing the mar-
ginal distribution attached to this client. We now introduce the joint distribution accross clients. In
the case of two clients i.e. I = 2, a state of the world is described by a vector ! 2 f0; !1gf0; !2g.
the joint distribution is dened by the following contingency table :
0 !2
0 12 1 (1  2) 1
!1 2 (1  1) 1  1   2 + 12 1  1
2 1  2
Table 1
The last row and last colum correspond to the marginals. All the information about the
correlation accross states is contained in the coecient . The circumstances infuencing the gas
demand of the two clients are independent when  = 1. In contrats, they are perfectly correlated
when  = 11 =
1
2
.
An alternative way to model simply the correlation would consist in adding an extra component
in the product space
QI
i=1 f!i; !ig, say 
 =
n
; 
o
QIi=1 f!i; !ig and assuming the joint distri-
bution as the product of the marginals. In such setting, the uncertainty aecting client i would
consist of two terms : a macroeconomic or climatic term  together with an idiosyncratic term !i.
The analysis of the demand of gas by households and rms could be conducted as before, under
the asssumption that Vi(xi; !) = vi(xi+ +!i). However, there are four states of the world at the
level of each client and the analytics become more tedious.
Hereafter , we focus on the case where only the idiosyncratic risk is taken into consideration
i.e. we assume that the individual demands are independent. From the perspective of the rm
supplying gas to this population of clients, the stochastic demand at time t  is therefore a sum
of independent (but not identically distributed) Bernouilli random variables exi where :
exi =
8<: xi

p; p

+ xi

p; p

with probability i
xi

p; p

with probability 1  i
The aggregate demand consists of a deterministic term
PI
i=1 xi

p; p

and a random termPI
i=1 xi

p; p

. The rst term is the aggregate advance purchase while the second terme is the
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aggregate purchase on the spot market. Both are inuenced by the two dimensional price policy
p; p

.
In some cases, it will be useful to replace the exact aggregate demand by its Gaussian approximation15.
We do it in the case of the residential aggregate demand but the same argument applies in the case
of the aggregate industrial demand. If :PI1
i=1 i (1  i) (1+i + (1  i)1+)(xi(!i))2+
(
qPI
i=1 
2
i )
2+
!
I!1
0
we deduce from the Lyapounov 's central limit theorem that if I is large enough, X

p; p

PI1
i=1

xi

p; p

+ xi

p; p

behaves approximatively as a Gaussian random variable N(; ) where
 =
I1X
i=1
i with i = xi

p; p

+ ixi

p; p

for all i = 1; :::; I1
 =
vuut I1X
i=1
2i with i =
q
i(1  i)xi

p; p

for all i = 1; :::; I1
3 The Monopoly Optimal Policy
The main contribution of this section is to derive the optimal capacity reservation and pricing
policy of the monopoly. On the one hand, the monopoly has to decide how much capacity to
reserve in advance. Two events may occur. If the capacity can match the realized demand, then
there is no need to buy extra capacity on the spot market. Otherwise, the monopoly will be
obliged to buy on the spot market the missing capacity. The unitary prices of these two markets
are regulated and denoted respectively c and c for advance and spot capacity reservations. We
assume that there is no possible resale for capacities i.e. that there is no secundary market, any
unused capacity is worthless. On the pricing side, the monopoly oer two contractual options to
its clients : any unitary quantity of gas purchased rmly in advance is sold at the price p while any
unitary quantity purchased a day in advance is sold at the price p. We assume that the monopoly
can credibly commit on its prices.
The aggregate demand is stochastic. This implies two sources of randomness : on the sales
side, the revenues are uncertain and on the costs side, the nal cost is also dependent upon the
amount of extra capacity that the operator may have to buy on the spot market. As it will bve
transparent below, we will separate the input decision (advance capacity reservations) from the
15Any Gaussian variable takes negative values with positive probability. Since demand is non negative, we will
have to be careful with that implication of the approximation.
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pricing decisions. we ignore here the other part of the cost incurred by the monopoly, namely
the purchase of gas at some entry point. Under the assumption that this cost is constant and
governed by long term contracts (say with importers), the extension of our results to this setting is
straightforward : the optimal relative markups are the same as without this additional cost. This
assumption is realistic for the case where the monopoly is the the part of the historical monopoly
after unbundling. It is less realistic in the case where the monopoly is a new entrant which does
not access to these long term arrangements and can be obliged (besides gas release arrangements)
in some circumstances to buy gas on the "marche de gros".
Since the prot of the monopoly is random, it is important to know how it evaluates risky
strategies. Denoting by e the random prot, a good and simple utility function f to describe that
feature is given by the CARA class. Precisely :
f() =  e 
where  is a positive parameter representing its absolute aversion towards risk. A computatinal
advantage oered by this class is that we can demonstrate that if e is a Gaussian random variable
N(; ), then the certainty equivalent objective is simply :
  
2
2
The solution of the problem is already complicated in that case16. This is why, we will focus
for the moment on the case where the monopoly is risk neutral
3.1 The General Formulation
We denote by e p; p the monopoly prot. It is the random variable dened as follows :
p
24 I1X
i=1
xi(p; p) +
I2X
j=1
xj

p; p
35+ p
24 I1X
i=1
exi p; p+ I2X
j=1
fxj p; p
35
 cz   cez
where z is the capacity reserved in advanced and :
ez =
8<: 0 if
PI1
i=1 exi(p; p) +PI2j=1fxj p; p  zPI1
i=1 exi(p; p) +PI2j=1fxj p; p  z if PI1i=1 exi(p; p) +PI2j=1fxj p; p > z
We deduce that the expected prot of the monopoly is equal to :
16Preliminary results are available upon request from the authors.
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p24 I1X
i=1
xi(p; p) +
I2X
j=1
xj

p; p
35+ p
24 I1X
i=1
ixi

p; p

+
I2X
j=1
jxj

p; p
35
 cz   c
Z +1
z
0@ I1X
i=1
exi(p; p) + I2X
j=1
fxj p; p  z
1AP (dex)
where P denotes the distribution of the aggregate random demand ex where
ex  I1X
i=1
exi(p; p) + I2X
j=1
fxj p; p
Under the Gaussian approximation, the expected prot simplies to :
p
24 I1X
i=1
xi(p; p) +
I2X
j=1
xj

p; p
35+ p
24 I1X
i=1
ixi

p; p

+
I2X
j=1
jxj

p; p
35
 cz   c
Z +1
z
 ex  z  1

p
2
e 
(ex )2
22 dex
R+1
2 (x  2)2 1p2e
  (x 1)2
22 dx
where ex is the Gaussian random variable N(; ) with :
  1 + 2 et  =
vuuut I1X
i=1
2i +
I2X
j=1
2j
Under the assumption that the monopoly is risk neutral, then its optimal policy

p; p; z

is
solution of the program :
Max
(p;p;z)
p
24 I1X
i=1
xi(p; p) +
I2X
j=1
xj

p; p
35+ p
24 I1X
i=1
ixi

p; p

+
I2X
j=1
jxj

p; p
35
 cz   c
Z +1
z
(ex  z) 1

p
2
e 
(ex )2
22 dex
The rst order condition with respect to z leads to the fondamental equation :Z +1
z
1

p
2
e 
(ex )2
22 dex = c
c
i.e. the optimal reservation of transport capacity z(p; p) at time t  satises :
1p
2
Z z 

 1
e 
t2
2 dt = 1  c
c
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or equivalently :
z = + (1  c
c
)
where  () is the unique solution to the equation :
1p
2
Z ()
 1
e 
t2
2 dt = 
For the record, table 2 below provides a sample of values of  ().
 0:8 0:9 0:95 0:99
() 0:845 1:285 1:645 2:325
Table 2
Then after solving for z, the monopoly choice problem simplies to the following two dimensional
problem :
Max
(p;p)
p
24 I1X
i=1
xi(p; p) +
I2X
j=1
xj

p; p
35+ p
24 I1X
i=1
ixi

p; p

+
I2X
j=1
jxj

p; p
35
 c

+ (1  c
c
)

  c
Z +1
+(1  c
c
)
ex    (1  c
c
)

1

p
2
e 
(ex )2
22 dex
where :
 =
I1X
i=1

xi

p; p

+ ixi

p; p

+
I2X
j=1

xj

p; p

+ jxj

p; p

and
 =
vuuut I1X
i=1
i(1  i)x2i

p; p

+
I2X
j=1
j(1  j)x2j

p; p

For the sake of calculus, it is useful to observe17 that :Z +1
z
(ex  z) 1

p
2
e 
(ex )2
22 dex =  Z +1
z 

(1  F (t))dt
where :
F (x) 
Z x
 1
1p
2
e 
t2
2 dt
17The equality follows from a straightforward integration by parts.
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This reduced form indicates that the vector of prices

p; p

inuences the objective through
direct channels like the classical demand and cost components. The analysis here is complicated by
the fact that the optimal technological choice which consists here in a mix of advance transportation
capacity reservations and spot transportation capacity reservations cannot be separated from the
pricing decisions. Under suitable second order conditions, the determination of the optimal policy
p; p

is solution of the two rst order conditions attached to these variables. The analytical
derivation as well as the interpretation of these equations is quite tricky in the general case. In the
next section, we oer a complete analysis in the case where the total population of clients consists
of two homogenous groups..
3.2 Two Homogeneous Classes of Clients
Hereafter, we assume that the populations of residential and industrial clients of this monopoly are
homogeneous : all the residential clients on the one hand and all the industrial clients on the other
hand display the same characteristics concerning their needs/tastes for gas consumption and the
volatility of their demand. As it should be clear, this binary assumption accomodates of course
many alternative illustrations like for instance the case of a monopoly whose clients are all either
residential or industrial but partitioned into two groups. Formally, we assume that :
i  1, vi  v1; !i  !1 for all i = 1; ::::; I1
j  2, vj  v2; !j  !2 for all j = 1; ::::; I2
The problem of the monopoly simplies to :
Max
(p;p)
264 p

I1x1

p; p

+ I2x2

p; p

+ p

I11x1

p; p

+ I22x2

p; p

 cz

p; p

  c R+1
z(p;p) 

(1  F (t)) dt
375
The rst order conditions are as follows :
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p24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ hI1x1 p; p+ I2x2 p; pi
+p
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
 c
24@z

p; p

@p
35  c
240@1  F (z

p; p

  

)
1A @z

p; p

@p
35
 c
0@1  F (z

p; p

  

)
1A @
@p
 c
24Z +1
z(p;p) 

(1  F (t)) dt+
0@z

p; p

  

1A0@1  F (z

p; p

  

)
1A35 @
@p
= 0
and
24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ p
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
+
h
I11x1

p; p

+ I22x2

p; p
i
 c
24@z

p; p

@p
35  c
241  F (z p; p @z

p; p

@p
35
 c
0@1  F (z

p; p

  

)
1A @
@p
 c
24Z +1
z(p;p) 

(1  F (t)) dt+
0@z

p; p

  

1A0@1  F (z

p; p

  

)
1A35 @
@p
= 0
Remembering that :
z

p; p

= + (1  c
c
)
where here :
 = I1

x1

p; p

+ 1x1

p; p

+ I2

x2

p; p

+ 2x2

p; p

 =
r
I11(1  1)

x1

p; p
2
+ I22(1  2)

x2

p; p
2
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we obtain after simplications and substitutions :
p
24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ hI1x1 p; p+ I2x2 p; pi
+p
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
 c@
@p
  c
"Z +1
z(p;p) 

(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
#
@
@p
= 0
and
p
24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ p
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
+
h
I11x1

p; p

+ I22x2

p; p
i
 c@
@p
  c
"Z +1
z(p;p) 

(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
#
@
@p
= 0
Using the fact that :
@
@p
= I1
@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
+ I11
@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
@
@p
= I1
@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
+ I11
@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
@
@p
=

I11(1  1)x1

p; p

@x1(p;p)
@p + I
22(1  2)x2

p; p

@x2(p;p)
@p

rh
I11(1  1) (x1)2

p; p

+ I22(1  2) (x2)2

p; p
i
@
@p
=

I11(1  1)x1

p; p

@x1(p;p)
@p + I
22(1  2)x2

p; p

@x2(p;p)
@p

rh
I11(1  1) (x1)2

p; p

+ I22(1  2) (x2)2

p; p
i
we obtain after some rearrangements :
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
p  c
24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ (p  c)
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
=  
h
I1x1

p; p

+ I2x2

p; p
i
+c
"Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
# I11(1  1)x1 p; p @x1(p;p)@p + I22(1  2)x2 p; p @x2(p;p)@p rh
I11(1  1) (x1)2

p; p

+ I22(1  2) (x2)2

p; p
i
and

p  c
24I1@x1

p; p

@p
+ I2
@x2

p; p

@p
35+ (p  c)
24I11@x1

p; p

@p
+ I22
@x2

p; p

@p
35
=  
h
I11x1

p; p

+ I22x2

p; p
i
+c
"Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
# I11(1  1)x1 p; p @x1(p;p)@p + I22(1  2)x2 p; p @x2(p;p)@p rh
I11(1  1) (x1)2

p; p

+ I22(1  2) (x2)2

p; p
i
or equivalently :

p  c
 h
1e
1 + 2e
2
i
+ (p  c)
h
11
1f1 + 22
2f2
i
=  1 + c
"Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
#24 I21
h
1(1  1) (1)2 f1 + 2 (2)2 (1  2)2f2
i
q
I1 (I2)2 1(1  1) (1)2 + I2 (I1)2 2 (2)2 (1  2)2
35
and

p  c
 h
1g
1 + 2g
2
i
+ (p  c)
h
11
1h1 + 22
2h2
i
=   1 + 
11 + 22
+
c
"Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
#24 I21
h
1(1  1) (1)2 h1 + 2 (2)2 (1  2)2h2
i
q
I1 (I2)2 1(1  1) (1)2 + I2 (I1)2 2 (2)2 (1  2)2
35
where for i = 1; 2 :
23
i 
Iixi

p; p

I1x1

p; p

+ I2x2

p; p
 ,   2
1
, i 
xi

p; p

xi

p; p
 , ei  @xi

p; p

@p
p
xi

p; p

f i 
@xi

p; p

p
p
xi

p; p
@p, gi  @xi

p; p

@p
p
xi

p; p
and hi  @xi

p; p

@p
p
xi

p; p

These two fundamental equations describe in reduced form the optimal pricing policy of the
monopoly. They express the dierential between the two prices and the unit cost c for reserving in
advance i.e. at time t  some transportation capacity. In matrix form, they are as follows :
A
 
p  c
p  c
!
=
 
B
B
!
where :
A 
 
1e
1 + 2e
2 11
1f1 + 22
2f2
1g
1 + 2g
2 11
1h1 + 22
2h2
!
and :
B =

 1 + c
R+1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ cc(1  cc)
 
I21[1(1 1)(1)2f1+2(2)2(1 2)2f2]p
I1(I2)21(1 1)(1)2+I2(I1)22(2)2(1 2)2
 
B =   1 + 
11 + 22
+c
"Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t)) dt+ c
c
(1  c
c
)
#24 I21
h
1(1  1) (1)2 h1 + 2 (2)2 (1  2)2h2
i
q
I1 (I2)2 1(1  1) (1)2 + I2 (I1)2 2 (2)2 (1  2)2
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A closed form solution as well as an interpretation of these equations is not immediate in this
general two class case. Note however that as formulated, the system is ready for calibration as the
market shares and elasticity parameters playing a major role in the determination of the prices are
identied.
 The parameters 1 and 2 measure the respective market shares of the two groups of clients
on the advance-purchase markets.
 The parameters 1and 2 measure the respective magnitude of the advance-purchase and spot
sales for the two groups of clients.
 The dierent direct and cross price elasticities : e1; e2; f1; f2; g1, g2, h1and h2.
 The respective volatilities of the two groups of clients measured by the parameters 1 et 2.
The volatility is measured here through the quantity j i   12 j.
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It would be interesting to look at a calibrated model based on a reasonable set of values for the
parameters in order to evaluate dierences in prices proposed by european pipelin operatord for
dierent terms (month, year) of transportation capacity. Note however that these parameters are
not independent as we should anticipate for basic consumer or producer theory. Further, as in the
case of Ramsey-Boiteux prices, they don't represent, strictly speaking, a solution as the parameters
depend themselves upon the pair of prices. In the next section, we continue this examination in
the simplest one class case i.e. with an homogeneous population of clients.
3.3 The Optimal Prices in the Homogeneous Case
In order to highlight the main ingredients shaping the derivation of the optimal pricing policy
p; p

, we examine the fundamental equations in the case where the population of clients consists
of one, instead of two, homogeneous group of I clients. Each client is characterized by the triple
; x

p; p

; x

p; p

and we denote simply by e; f; g; h the four direct elasticities introduced in
the preceding subsection. To derive the optimal prices in a more transparent way, we rst look
back to the total cost function of the monopoly. Remember that it results from an optimization
process through the adequate choice of the capacity reservation z. If the monopoly knows that the
aggregate stochastic demand ex is described by a Gaussian random variable N(; ), the optimal
choice of z results from the following minimization problem :
Min
z
cz + c
2664Z +1
z
(ex  z) e (
ex )2
22

p
2
dex
3775
As already demonstrated, the total cost can be expressed alternatively as :
cz + c
Z +1
z 

(1  F (t))dt
The optimal capacity reservation satises :
c = c(1  F (z   

)) i.e. z = + (1  c
c
)
The cost function of the monopoly is therefore :
C(; ) = c+
 
c(1  c
c
) + c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
!

This formulation of the cost function emphasizes the contribution of the aggregate rst and
second moments of the total gas consumption at time t. We note that it is linear with respect to
both  and . The constant marginal costs of both variables are respectively :
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@C(; )
@
= c and
@C(; )
@
= c(1  c
c
) + c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
To trace back the marginal cost of the individual demands

x

p; p

; x

p; p

, we will substitute
the following expressions of  and  :
 = I

x

p; p

+ x

p; p

and
 = x

p; p
q
I (1  )
The rst order conditions describing the optimal policy

p; p

are :
Ix

p; p

+ Ip
@x
@p

p; p

+ Ip
@x
@p

p; p

=
@C(; )
@
@
@p
+
@C(; )
@
@
@p
Ip
@x
@p

p; p

+ Ix

p; p

+ Ip
@x
@p

p; p

=
@C(; )
@
@
@p
+
@C(; )
@
@
@p
After substitution, we obtain :

p  c
 @x
@p

p; p

+ 
0@p  c   c(1  c
c
) + c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
!s
(1  )
I
1A @x
@p

p; p

=  x

p; p


p  c
 @x
@p

p; p

+ 
0@p  c   c(1  c
c
) + c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
!s
(1  )
I
1A @x
@p

p; p

=  x

p; p

For the sake of notational simplication, let us denote respectively by q and q the expressions
p   c and p  

c+

c(1  cc) + c
R+1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
q
(1 )
I

. In matrix form, the two rst
order conditions simplify to :0@ @x@p p; p  @x@p p; p
@x
@p

p; p

 @x@p

p; p
 1A q
q
!
=
0@  x p; p
 x

p; p
 1A
We obtain :
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  @x@p

p; p

x

p; p

+ 2 @x@p

p; p

x

p; p



@x
@p

p; p

@x
@p

p; p

  @x@p

p; p

@x
@p

p; p

and
q =
@x
@p

p; p

x

p; p

   @x@p

p; p

x

p; p



@x
@p

p; p

@x
@p

p; p

  @x@p

p; p

@x
@p

p; p

or more compactly, in terms of direct and cross elasticities and market shares :
p  c
p
=
 h+ gRR
eh  fg
and
p 

c+

c(1  cc) + c
R+1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
q
(1 )
I

p
=
f   eRR
 (eh  fg)
where :
R  px

p; p

and R  px

p; p

These two formulas provide the optimal relative markups of the monopoly on the two markets.
They point out immediately the respective roles of the four elasticities e; f; g and h as well as
the relative value of transactions RR on both markets. The knowledge of the parameters could
follow from an econometric analysis of the demand for natural gas. While doing so, it should be
mentionned that there are some structural implications of the demand theory that we are using that
should be pointed out. In the homogeneous case considered in this subsection, these implications
are easy to derive. We limit ourselves to the case where all the clients are households purchasing
gas on both markets. The two rst order conditions describing the optimal interior purchase plan
x

p; p

; x

p; p

of a generic household are :
v0(x+ x) + (1  )v0(x+ !) = p
v0(x+ x) = p
Denoting by  the inverse of v0, we obtain :
x = 

p  p
1  

  !
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x =  (p)  

p  p
1  

+ !
from which we deduce :
@x
@p

p; p

=
1
1  
0

p  p
1  

< 0
@x
@p

p; p

=
 
1  
0

p  p
1  

> 0
@x
@p

p; p

=
 1
1  
0

p  p
1  

> 0
@x
@p

p; p

=

1  
0

p  p
1  

+ 0 (p) < 0
The sign inequalities follow from the fact that  is decreasing. We note that the quantities
of gas bought on the advance-purchase and spot markets are substitutes18. Moreover, up to the
normalization by , we obtain the Slutsky 's symmetry conditions :
@x
@p

p; p

= 
@x
@p

p; p

and
@x
@p

p; p
 @x
@p

p; p

  @x
@p

p; p
 @x
@p

p; p

=
1
1  
0

p  p
1  

0 (p) > 0
Finally, we also obtain19 :
@x
@p

p; p

=  @x
@p

p; p

@x
@p

p; p

<
@x
@p

p; p

In terms of elasticities, these restrictions translate as follow :
f = g
R
R
18This, together with the inequality below, implies that both markups are positive : the monopoly does not
underprice strategically one of the product to gain more on the other.
19The inequality does not hold in general and is a peculiar implication of our specication of utility.
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f =  ep
p
and
e < h
R
R

p
p
2
These behavioral restrictions should be of course tested against empirical data. For the time
being, we just notice that irrespective of whether they are true or not, the optimal pricing policy
is characterized by the pair of equations derived above. The fundamental question to be answered
now is to understand under which circumstances the ratio pp of prices is larger or smaller than the
ratio of access costs cc . While, as already noted, there is a positive markup on both markets, an
inequality like pp >
c
c could be interpreted as a biais towards the spot market. Finally, when the
right hand side of the above sytem of equations is equal to 0, the corresponding prices
p = c and p = c+
 
c(1  c
c
) + c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
!s
(1  )
I
are the optimal prices from the perspective of a regulator maximizing social surplus. If the
unit costs were themselves true marginal costs derived from technological constraints, then the
comparison between pp and
c
c would also be of some interest. In the case where  =
1
2 and I = 1,
we obtain :
p
p
= 1 + (1  c
c
) +
c
c
Z +1
(1  c
c
)
(1  F (t))dt
Table 3 below reproduces a sample of ratios.
c
c
3
2 2 5 10
p
p 1:5454 1:7979 2:3998 2:7550
Table 3
We may wonder for which value(s) of cc , the ratio
p
p=
c
c reaches its highest value. This amounts
to look at the maximum of the function ' dened as follows :
'(x)  1
x
+
1
x
(1  1
x
) +
Z +1
(1  1
x
)
(1  F (t))dt
Since :
'0(x) =   1
x2
  1
x2
(1  1
x
) +
1
x3
0(1  1
x
) +
1
x3
(1  F ((1  1
x
)))
=   1
x2
  1
x2
(1  1
x
)
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we deduce that :
'0(x) = 0 i (1  1
x
) =  1 which implies x = 1:19
It can be veried that in such case, the ratio pp exceeds the ratio
c
c by 8.4%.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a simple model to predict the pricing behavior of a rm selling
gas in a regulated market environment. To reect the current situation, as experimented in France
but also in some other countries, we have assumed that the access prices to the pipelines network
were decided by the regulator. The term network should be interpreted in a broad sense including :
entry/exit capacities and intermediate transportation ones. Of course, the eectiveness of the access
to these facilities is essential in an opening market situation. At a given point in time, these facilities
cannot be adjusted and, therefore, there is a maximal supply which acts as a constraint. European
gas pipeline companies oer a wide variety of contractual arrangements to sell these capacities.
Operators have the possibility to make reservation for a year, a month or a day. In each case,
the contract species the daily amount of gas which is permitted to enter, circulate or exit. Some
variability is allowed but it is rather limited. For each of them, the allocation rules describe how
many days ahead these reservations must be introduced and, at any time t, to whom the available
residual capacity is assigned during the all period preceding the termination of the process. Besides
oering rm capacities, most of European gas pipeline companies also oer interruptible capacities
and sometimes impose some clauses of restoration when the capacity share of an operator exceeds
20% of the total. Any operator is constrained to balance its gas ows; any major departure from
that balancing constraint results in penalties. Finally, a kind of secondary market to exchange
capacities is organized but, while transparent in terms of posting all the relevant informations, it
is not yet very eective. In practice the service consists only in an electronic bulletin board that
provide anonymous listing of supplies and demands for transport capacity.
In this paper, we have concentrated our attention on the case of a shipper selling gas to a
captive population of clients. To handle the supply service, the shipper has to subscribe to the
network operator a transportation capacity adapted to the global need of its portfolio. Therefore,
the determining of the relevant booking strategy becomes crucial. We have assumed that any client
does not know in advance for sure what will be its gas consumption: many uncertain events may
increase or decrease its consumption at any time during the contractual period. Some clients may
have very predictable consumption while others may display a signicant volatility. This second
class of clients is really problematic from the perspective of the shipper trying to plan its optimal
capacity reservations. To simplify the analysis, we have assumed that the shipper could either make
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annual reservations or daily reservations. He will propose to its clients two kinds of linear taris :
a rst tari applies to the gas purchased in advance and a second tari applies to the gas which is
purchased during the considered period.
This model paves the way for a better understanding of the reactions of some of the economic
agents acting on the market for natural gas. This little step has concentrated on the relationship
between the prices to access to the transportation network (under the control of the regulator)
and the prices by a monopoly delivering natural to a (captive) population of residential and (or)
industrial customers. Obviously, it can be generalized in many directions.
One rst direction could consist in removing the monopoly assumption and replace it by a true
model of imperfect competition between a limited number of rms. This game theoretical setting
raises a number of new and challenging questions as the oligopolists compete on several markets
and may face problems of capacities. From that perspective, we can see the contribution of this
paper as the determination of the best response of an agent in this competitive world.
A second direction of research would consist in an examination of a problem analogous to the
one examined in this paper but where the two contractual instruments would be replaced by two
other ones. A possible suggestion along these lines could be to consider two two-part taris: one
with a large xed component and a small variable component and another one with a smaller xed
part but a larger variable one. This would be consistent with the current practice on the retail
market : three dierent two-part taris are oered together (for clients with large consumption)
with a three-part tari which includes a third component based on an annual capacity reservation.
The per unit price of gas of a client varies with the contractual arrangement that he has selected
and its real consumption. In the context of uncertainty considered here, the clients will partition
themselvelves into several groups depending upon the expected volumes of consumption but also
volatility parameters. It seems worthwhile to look at the optimal pricing behavior of a monopoly
in this environment.
A third promising direction of research would consist in reintroducing the gas markets at the
entry and exchange points. We could assume that any rm selling gas can either buy gas through
long term contracts with gas producers or buy (or sell) on some "marche de gros". There are only
three such markets in Europe with limited scope in terms of volumes but also nancial instruments
but this picture may change rapidly. In such richer environment, the joint impact of the cost of
gas and the cost of capacity reservation would become more intricated.
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